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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 In a far-reaching opinion, the district court limited 
the application of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act to the 
activities of a New Jersey franchisee within New Jersey on the 
ground that giving the Act extraterritorial effect would conflict 
with the dormant Commerce Clause.  Before we reach this issue of 
first impression, we must wind through the present status of the 
law on Pullman abstention and an England reservation. 
  
 I. 
 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The relevant facts are not disputed.  Computer 
Curriculum Corporation (CCC), a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in Palo Alto, California, produces and markets an 
integrated learning system that uses computer technology to teach 
and monitor a student's progress.  Since 1975, Instructional 
Systems, Inc. (ISI), a New Jersey corporation,1 was CCC's 
exclusive distributor in the northeastern United States, subject 
to limited reservations by CCC.  The parties entered into an 
agreement in 1984 that provided that ISI would be CCC's exclusive 
reseller in Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont 
and Washington D.C., and that for its part ISI would sell only in 
those states and would deal only in CCC products.  The Agreement 
provided that it would continue in effect until July 31, 1989.  
Finally, the Agreement provided that it "shall be construed and 
interpreted, and the legal relations created by it shall be 
determined, in accordance with the laws of the State of 
California."  Jt. App. at 934. 
 As 1989 approached, CCC decided not to extend its 
relationship with ISI for the entire territory covered by the 
                     
1
.  Originally, CCC's arrangement was with ISI's predecessor, 
Educomp of New Jersey.  The principal of both corporations was 
the same, Phyllis Kaminer. 
 
 
 
  
1984 Agreement because, it claims, ISI was not aggressively 
marketing in some of the states.  Instead, it offered ISI a two-
year contract which limited ISI's market territory to New Jersey, 
New York and Massachusetts, thereby allowing CCC to distribute 
its products directly in the other (former ISI) states.  ISI 
executed the 1989 Agreement under protest on January 30, 1989, 
and simultaneously filed its complaint in the Superior Court of 
New Jersey, Chancery Division. 
 The complaint contained seven counts.  Count One 
alleged that the 1984 Agreement constituted a "franchise" for 
purposes of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act ("NJFPA" or 
"Act"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-3,2 10-4,3 and that CCC violated 
the NJFPA by (a) failing to renew without good cause in violation 
                     
2
.  Section 10-3(a) of the NJFPA defines a "franchise" as a: 
 
 written arrangement for a definite or indefinite 
period, in which a person grants to another person a 
license to use a trade name, trade mark, service mark, 
or related characteristics, and in which there is a 
community of interest in the marketing of goods or 
services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or 
otherwise. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-3(a) (West 1989) (emphasis added). 
3
.  Section 10-4 limits the scope of the NJFPA by providing that 
"[t]his act applies only to a franchise . . . the performance of 
which contemplates or requires the franchisee to establish or 
maintain a place of business within the State of New Jersey."  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-4 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis 
added).  The NJFPA defines a "place of business" as a "fixed 
geographical location at which the franchisee displays for sale 
and sells the franchisor's goods or offers for sale and sells the 
franchisor's services.  Place of business shall not mean an 
office, a warehouse, a place of storage, a residence or a 
vehicle."  Id. § 56:10-3(f). 
  
of Section 10-5,4 and (b) attempting to impose unreasonable 
standards of performance upon ISI in the formation of the 1989 
Agreement in violation of Section 10-7.5  Counts Two through 
Seven alleged a variety of state common law claims.6  As a remedy 
for each count, ISI sought an injunction restraining CCC from 
terminating its relationship with ISI and damages. 
 CCC removed the case to federal court on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship.  In June 1989, following discovery, ISI 
moved for a preliminary injunction and partial summary judgment 
on the issue of whether the 1984 Agreement constituted a 
franchise agreement under the NJFPA.  CCC opposed ISI's motions 
and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, arguing 
that (1) California, not New Jersey, law applied to the 1984 
                     
4
.  Section 10-5 of the NJFPA, which sets forth the requirements 
for the termination of a franchise, provides in part: 
 
 It shall be a violation of this act for any franchisor 
to terminate, cancel or fail to renew a franchise 
without good cause.  For the purposes of this act, good 
cause for terminating, canceling, or failing to renew a 
franchise shall be limited to failure by the franchisee 
to substantially comply with those requirements imposed 
upon him by the franchise. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-5 (West 1989) (emphasis added). 
5
.  Section 10-7 of the NJFPA prohibits franchisors from 
"impos[ing] unreasonable standards of performance upon a 
franchisee."  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-7(e) (West 1989). 
6
.  Specifically, Count Two alleged a breach of contract; Count 
Three, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; Count Four, tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage; Count Five, a breach of a covenant of non-
competition; Count Six, unjust enrichment; and Count Seven, a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
  
Agreement; (2) application of the NJFPA to the franchise 
territory outside New Jersey would violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause; (3) the 1984 Agreement was not a franchise as defined by 
the NJFPA; and (4) CCC's actions were not in violation of the 
NJFPA.  ISI responded by petitioning the district court to 
abstain pursuant to Railroad Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 
(1941), so that the NJFPA claim could be considered by the New 
Jersey courts. 
 The district court granted ISI's request for abstention 
over CCC's objection that the case could be resolved without 
reaching the constitutional questions raised by its motion for 
partial summary judgment.  The court reasoned that "[i]f the New 
Jersey courts determine ISI does not fit within the definitional 
requirements of a franchise or that the Franchise Practices Acts 
is inapplicable to States other than New Jersey, then the need to 
address the commerce clause question in this matter will be 
eliminated."  Jt. App. at 577.   
 ISI filed a suit for declaratory judgment in the New 
Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division on July 27, 1989.  After 
additional discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment.   
The court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of ISI, holding  
(1) that New Jersey law applied to the 1984 Agreement despite the 
choice-of-law provision of the Agreement; (2) that the 1984 
Agreement was a "franchise" for purposes of the NJFPA, and (3) 
that the NJFPA applied even though the agreement encompassed a 
multistate territory.  See Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer 
Curriculum Corp., No. C-4116-89E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Oct. 
  
30, 1989) (ISI I).  The Appellate Division of the Superior Court 
reversed, see Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum 
Corp., 578 A.2d 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (ISI II), 
but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division 
and reinstated the judgment of the Chancery Division in October 
1992, see Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 
614 A.2d 124 (N.J. 1992) (ISI III).   
 The Supreme Court analyzed the issues before it in a 
series of questions.  First, it decided what a franchise was 
under the NJFPA.  Then it proceeded with the threshold choice-of-
law question, holding that although "a close question," the trial 
court had not erred in applying New Jersey law because New Jersey 
has a strong policy in favor of protecting its franchisees and 
because the franchisee is located in New Jersey, the majority of 
its employees reside in New Jersey, the investments relate 
primarily to assets in New Jersey, and the goodwill was developed 
for CCC by New Jersey residents.  Id. at 135. 
 The Court then proceeded to determine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to find the statutory requirements for 
the existence of a franchise, which depended on whether ISI had a 
"place of business" in New Jersey, a "license," and a "community 
of interest" with CCC.  Finding that these were all satisfied, 
see id. at 136-46, the Court then turned to the question whether 
the Act has "extraterritorial reach to the franchise activities    
in states other than New Jersey."  Id. at 146.  The Court 
reasoned that at its core, the NJFPA "is meant to deal with the 
unconscionable business practices affecting New Jersey 
  
franchises," id. at 147, but that in meeting that purpose, the 
application of the Act did not stop at New Jersey's border.  In 
its consideration of this issue, the Court discussed whether the 
application of New Jersey law in this manner would be consistent 
with the Commerce Clause.  It reasoned that "New Jersey has no 
power, and therefore no interest, to regulate commerce that 
occurs entirely beyond its borders," but that this statute was 
regulating only "in-state conduct that has out-of-state effects."  
Id. at 146.  The Court thus saw no unconstitutionality under the 
Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause "despite some incidental 
extraterritorial effects."  Id. at 148. 
 The case then returned to the district court.  CCC 
moved for partial summary judgment as to that portion of Count 
One that was based on application of the NJFPA outside of New 
Jersey.  The district court gave notice of the attack on the 
constitutionality of the NJFPA to the Attorney General of New 
Jersey, see 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (1988), who chose to participate 
but did not formally intervene.  On June 2, 1993, the district 
court granted CCC's motion for partial summary judgment as to the 
portion of Count One that sought to enjoin CCC from terminating 
ISI's franchise in states other than New Jersey.  The district 
court's ruling was based on its determination that application of 
the NJFPA outside New Jersey was a per se violation of the 
Commerce Clause.  See Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer 
  
Curriculum Corp., 826 F. Supp. 831, 848 (D.N.J. 1993) (ISI IV).  
ISI and the Attorney General appealed.7 
 CCC then moved for summary judgment on the six 
remaining common law claims as well as the remainder of Count 
One.  The district court granted partial summary judgment on the 
common law claims on November 9, 1993, leaving for trial only 
                     
7
.  On June 16, ISI petitioned the district court for 
certification of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), and the Attorney General asked for a certification under 
either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or § 1292(b) on June 
18.  ISI also filed a notice of appeal (docketed in this court as 
No. 93-5414) on July 2, arguing that this court had jurisdiction 
because the district court had denied its motion for an 
injunction.  On July 22, the district court denied the parties' 
requests under § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b), reasoning that ISI's 
notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to certify the order 
under either of the sections.   
 
 The Attorney General filed a petition for mandamus on 
August 12 (No. 93-5490) asking this court to order the district 
court to consider the certification requests, and a motions panel 
of this court remanded the case to the district court on 
September 20 "so that it may consider whether to grant motions 
for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(b) free of its concern as to jurisdictional restraint by 
reason of the interlocutory appeal."  Jt. App. at 1301.  After 
the district court denied the motions on the merits on October 5, 
ISI filed a petition for mandamus on October 25 to vacate the 
June 2 district court order (No. 93-5635) and the Attorney 
General filed a supplemental petition for mandamus on November 10 
seeking the same. 
  
that portion of Count One that which alleged that CCC has imposed 
unreasonable terms and conditions on ISI in the 1989 Agreement as 
regards to New Jersey.  See Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer 
Curriculum Corp., No. 89-502(AJL) (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 1993) (ISI V). 
ISI appealed.8 
 On appeal, this court granted the Attorney General's 
motion to intervene in No. 93-5414, and consolidated the five 
related appeals and petitions for disposition.  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeals docketed at Nos. 93-5414, 93-5722 
and 94-5048 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).9  Because the 
questions on appeal are legal, we exercise plenary review. 
                     
8
.  ISI filed a notice of appeal on November 24, 1993 (No. 93-
5722), claiming jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  In 
mid-December CCC moved to certify the summary judgment orders as 
final under Rule 54(b).  After ISI withdrew its opposition, the 
district judge to whom the case had been reassigned certified the  
summary judgment orders of June 2 and November 9 under Rule 54(b) 
on December 27.  The Attorney General then filed a timely appeal 
from this order on January 25, 1994 (No. 94-5048).  The remaining 
claim under the NJFPA, that the 1989 Agreement imposed 
unreasonable conditions of performance, was stayed pending the 
appeal.   
9
.  While there is some question whether we would have had 
jurisdiction over the appeals docketed at Nos. 93-5414 and 93-
5722 because the action was still pending below and the orders 
may not have met the requirements laid out in Carson v. American 
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1981), the district court's 
certification of these orders as appealable under Rule 54(b) 
resolves this issue.  We have held that even after a notice of 
appeal has been filed, a proper Rule 54(b) certification will 
cure any jurisdictional defect of a premature appeal.  See 
Feather v. United Mine Workers of America, 711 F.2d 530, 535 (3d 
Cir. 1983). Since we have jurisdiction over all the district 
court's relevant orders to date, we will deny the petitions for 
mandamus in Nos. 93-5490 and 93-5635.  See Helstoski v. Meanor, 
442 U.S. 500, 506 (1979) (mandamus inappropriate when direct 
appeal immediately available). 
  
 II. 
 DISCUSSION 
 A. 
 Abstention, Reservation and Preclusion 
 ISI contends that we are bound to accept not only the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision on the scope of the NJFPA and 
its application to its arrangement with CCC but also that Court's 
conclusion that such an application did not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause, as CCC had argued.  CCC would limit not only the 
effect of the New Jersey courts' interpretation of the federal 
constitutional issue, but also their interpretation of the state 
law issues.  These contentions require that we examine the 
circumstances surrounding the district court's Pullman 
abstention.   
 In deciding to abstain, the court stated that it was 
"remitt[ing]" to the state courts: "(a) Whether the Act has 
extraterritorial reach beyond the State of New Jersey . . . ; and 
(b) What are the definitions and standards of 'community of 
interest,' 'license' and 'place of business' under the Act?"  Jt. 
App. at 587.  It reserved to itself the "[a]pplication of the 
principles of law determined by the state court to the facts of 
this case"; "[a]ny constitutional challenge to the Act"; and 
"[a]ny application for injunctive or other interim relief."  Jt. 
App. at 588.  On ISI's request for clarification, the court 
explained that it expected the parties to file a declaratory 
judgment action.  It recognized that to avoid giving an advisory 
opinion, the state court would have to look at the facts of this 
  
case in order to render its decision on the state law issues, but 
reiterated that it was maintaining fact-finding jurisdiction over 
the constitutional question.   
 Neither party presently challenges the propriety of 
abstaining per se.10  However, the parties vigorously dispute the 
scope and effect of the district court's abstention. 
 
 1. 
 Pullman Abstention 
 It is a general rule that "federal courts lack the 
authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has 
been conferred."  New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989).  There are a small number of 
"exceptional circumstances" which justify deviation from this 
rule.  See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).  "Abstention . . . is the exception and 
not the rule.  The federal courts' obligation to adjudicate 
claims within their jurisdiction is virtually unflagging."  Marks 
v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
 The abstention doctrine that stems from Railroad 
Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), provides that "when a 
                     
10
.  No party took an appeal from the order abstaining and 
staying the federal proceedings.  See Hovsons Inc. v. Secretary 
of the Interior of the U.S., 711 F.2d 1208, 1211 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeal from district 
court's order to stay federal proceedings on Pullman grounds).  
 
  
federal court is presented with both a federal constitutional 
issue and an unsettled issue of state law whose resolution might 
narrow or eliminate the federal constitutional question, 
abstention may be justified under principles of comity in order 
to avoid needless friction with state policies."  Marks, 19 F.3d 
at 882 n.6 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Chez Sez 
III Corp. v. Township of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(describing three-step analysis of Pullman abstention), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992). 
 Pullman abstention is "virtually prohibited in 
diversity cases where the only difficulty is the unsettled 
posture of state law."  Urbano v. Board of Managers of N.J. State 
Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
948 (1970); see also McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 
n.5 (1963); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943).  
However, there are some situations for abstention even when the 
suit is brought under diversity jurisdiction.  In Clay v. Sun 
Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960), the Court held 
that abstention was appropriate in a diversity suit when the 
defendant had raised doubts about the constitutionality of the 
statute relied upon by the plaintiff and the court "could not, on 
the available materials, make a confident guess how the [state] 
Supreme Court would construe the statute."  Under these 
conditions, the Court found that abstention was justified "where 
a federal constitutional question might be mooted [by securing] 
. . . an authoritative state court's determination of an 
unresolved question of its local law."  Id.   
  
 This court has also recognized such a situation under 
precisely the same statute at issue here.  In Consumers Oil Corp. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 F.2d 816, 819 (3d Cir. 1973), we 
held that abstention was appropriate in a diversity suit claiming 
a violation of the NJFPA because state law was unclear as to 
whether the Act applied to the agreement at issue and, if it did, 
"substantial constitutional questions" would need to be faced.  
But see Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 860-61 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (abstention inappropriate in adjudicating 
constitutional objections to New Jersey common law analog to the 
NJFPA). 
  
 2. 
 England Reservation 
 A party displaced from federal court under Pullman does 
not lose its right to a federal forum for all its claims.  In 
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 
411 (1964), the Supreme Court was presented with a case in which 
the plaintiffs sued in federal court, were sent to the state 
courts under Pullman abstention, litigated all their claims 
there, lost, and then returned to federal court in an attempt to 
litigate their federal claims anew.  Plaintiffs argued that they 
felt compelled to litigate their federal claims in state court by 
the Court's decision in Government & Civic Employees Organizing 
Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957), which 
required parties remitted to the state courts under Pullman to 
inform those courts what their federal claims were so that the 
state courts had the opportunity to construe the statute "in 
light of" those claims.  
  In England, the Court sought to balance the parties' 
rights to a federal forum with the federalism concerns inherent 
in rendering a constitutional judgment on an unclear state 
statute.  It held that a party may preserve its right to return 
to federal court by making an express reservation in the state 
court that "he is exposing his federal claims there only for the 
purpose of complying with Windsor, and that he intends, should 
the state courts hold against him on the question of state law, 
to return to the District Court for disposition of his federal 
contentions."  375 U.S. at 421.  Such a reservation of federal 
  
claims may be made by any party to the litigation.  See id. at 
422 n.13. 
 In this case it is clear that the federal question of 
whether the NJFPA could be constitutionally applied to the 1984 
Agreement was explicitly reserved by CCC throughout the course of 
the state proceedings.  Indeed, when the case was reactivated in 
the district court, it was ISI which submitted a letter to the 
district court that "concluded that the record supports CCC's 
contention that it entered a proper England reservation."  Jt. 
App. at 1746.11   
 Although ISI now seeks to recant its conclusion,12 it 
is clear from the record that CCC properly preserved its England 
reservation.  At every stage of the state court proceedings, one 
                     
11
.  While noting several times when CCC had discussed the issue, 
ISI stated that "[t]he record can be interpreted to indicate that 
CCC presented the constitutional issue to the state courts in 
order to inform those court of its existence, as required by 
Windsor and England.  We have therefore concluded that CCC 
reserved its right to a determination by this Court of the 
federal constitutional issue."  Jt. App. at 1747. 
12
.  ISI claims for the first time in its brief in No. 93-5722 
that its concession was "mistaken," and suggests that despite its 
waiver of the issue, because there was no valid reservation the 
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim 
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Port Auth. Police 
Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that "lower federal courts lack 
subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of 
state court determinations or to evaluate constitutional claims 
that are 'inextricably intertwined with the state court's 
[decision] in a judicial proceeding.'" (citation omitted)).  It 
concedes that Rooker-Feldman does not apply if we find the 
England reservation to be properly preserved.  See Ivy Club v. 
Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 1282 (1992).  Because we do so find, we need not consider the 
effect of ISI's waiver. 
  
party, if not both, stated that any constitutional questions were 
reserved for the district court and were being raised only to 
comply with the Supreme Court's Windsor decision.13  We therefore 
reject ISI's claim that the fact that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court discussed the Commerce Clause issue in rendering its 
                     
13
.  In the Chancery Division of the Superior Court, CCC 
expressly reserved its federal claims both at a hearing, Jt. App. 
at 1583-84, and in its brief, Supp. App. at 833-34.  At the 
Appellate Division of the Superior Court, CCC noted that the 
district court had reserved jurisdiction to rule on any 
constitutional claims.  Supp. App. at 1094.  Its reference to the 
Commerce Clause was in the context of disputing the Chancery 
Division's statutory construction and arguing that interpreting 
the statute as the Chancery Division did would violate the 
Commerce Clause.  Supp. App. at 1107-09. 
 
 The parties took the same position before the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.  There was no dispute, as ISI noted in its 
submissions to the Supreme Court, that "the federal 
constitutional issue arising under the Commerce Clause . . . is 
reserved for the federal court." Supp. App. at 1455; see also 
Supp. App. at 1461 n.2, 1492-93.  CCC also made that point clear.  
Supp. App. at 1481. 
 
 Although CCC did mention the Commerce Clause issue in 
its merits brief, Supp. App. at 1543-44, it did so once again in 
the context of arguing that the Court should not construe the 
NJFPA to apply extraterritorially because that construction would 
impermissibly burden interstate commerce.  At the original oral 
argument and on rehearing, CCC and ISI both noted at various 
times that the Commerce Clause question was reserved for the 
district court. Supp. App. at 1662, 1666, 1837, and a member of 
the Court noted during the argument that "[t]he Commerce Clause 
issue is reserved."  Supp. Ap. at 1807. 
 
 In post-argument briefs, ISI suggested for the first 
time that CCC violated the England command not to "affirmatively 
argue" the constitutional issue because CCC had discussed the 
Commerce Clause issue in its brief and at oral argument.  Supp. 
App. at 1740-41.  CCC responded that "CCC has merely informed the 
Court, for its assistance in construing the New Jersey statute, 
of the serious constitutional problem presented by ISI's 
construction."  Supp. App. at 1772. 
  
decision about whether the Act applied extraterritorially, see 
ISI III, 614 A.2d at 146-48, precludes the federal courts' 
consideration of the issue, which was properly preserved.14  As 
the Supreme Court noted in England, "the parties cannot prevent 
the state court from rendering a decision on the federal question 
if it chooses to do so."  375 U.S. at 421; see also 17A Charles 
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4243 (1988).  
It is the actions of the displaced litigant which are controlling 
and thus, after reviewing the parties' actions, we agree with the 
Attorney General that "the Commerce Clause issue did remain 
pending before the District Court, and the District Court was 
obligated to adjudicate it."  Attorney General's Br. at 25. 
 ISI insists that even if CCC made a proper England 
reservation, we are bound by the factual findings and legal 
conclusions of the New Jersey courts by the full faith and credit 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), which requires that federal 
courts give "full faith and credit" to "judicial proceedings of 
                     
14
.  Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518 
(1986), which ISI cites, is inapposite.  In Parsons, the parties 
had concurrent actions pending in state and federal court 
regarding events arising out of the same conduct, the defendants 
first won in federal court, but the state court rejected the 
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the 
defendants were found liable in that forum.  The federal court 
then enjoined enforcement of the state court judgment because it 
determined that the state action was barred by res judicata. 
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in failing 
to apply state preclusion law and remanded for a determination of 
whether the state court's resolution of the res judicata issue 
would be given preclusive effect in another court of the same 
state.  It did not hold, as ISI implicitly suggests, that a state 
court's consideration of an issue precludes a federal court from 
doing so. 
  
any court of any State."  It is true that a federal court is 
normally bound to extend preclusive effect to state proceedings 
to the same extent that courts of that state would do so.  See 
Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84 
(1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980); cf. Township of 
Washington v. Gould, 189 A.2d 697, 700 (N.J. 1963) (declaratory 
judgments given preclusive effect under New Jersey law). 
 However, the Supreme Court noted in both those cases 
that when a party sought to adjudicate his claims in a federal 
forum and then was involuntarily remitted to state court, the 
party "can preserve his right to a federal forum for his federal 
claims by informing the state court of his intention to return to 
federal court on his federal claims following litigation of his 
state claims in state court."  Migra, 465 U.S. at 85 n.7 (citing 
England); see also Allen, 449 U.S. at 101-02 n.17 (distinguishing 
England reservations as having "no bearing on the present case").  
As we noted in Kovats v. Rutgers, 749 F.2d 1041, 1046 (3d Cir. 
1984), "in its major preclusion decisions the [Supreme] Court has 
sought to distinguish the England situation."  Thus the 
traditional rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel as 
applied by section 1738 do not apply to state proceedings that 
follow Pullman abstention and an England reservation.  See 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1072 (3d Cir. 
1990) (claim preclusion does not apply to state court proceedings 
when proper England reservation made); see also Fields v. 
Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1302 n.1, 1306 
  
(11th Cir. 1992) (Pullman/England situation is an exception to 
full faith and credit requirements). 
 CCC argues that notwithstanding the England 
reservation, the New Jersey decisions are binding only on 
discrete facts found, i.e. the existence of a "place of 
business," "community of interest," and "license," but not on the 
ultimate facts, such as whether the relationship was a franchise 
under New Jersey law.  It relies on the emphasis given in England 
to federal fact-finding.  See 375 U.S. at 416-17 ("How the facts 
are found will often dictate the decision of federal claims . . . 
[Therefore,] in cases where, but for the application of the 
abstention doctrine, the primary fact determination would have 
been by the District Court, a litigant may not be unwillingly 
deprived of that determination."). 
 We believe that the state law issues determined in the 
state court proceedings must be viewed as more than merely 
persuasive authority.  We held in Kovats that a "state court's 
resolution of the state law question that required Pullman 
abstention clearly must be given some preclusive effect; 
otherwise abstention would be a meaningless procedure."  749 F.2d 
at 1046.  The Supreme Court did not expect the state courts to 
issue abstract opinions of law, removed from the facts of the 
case, or resolve factual disputes only to have them treated as 
advisory opinions.  Instead, the Court anticipated that the state 
court decision might resolve the suit entirely.  See England, 375 
U.S. at 421; see also Phillips v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. 
Assistance Agency, 657 F.2d 554, 560 n.9 (3d Cir. 1981) 
  
(suggesting that state court decision under Pullman could 
definitively resolve the suit, even if resolution of legal issue 
was fact-intensive), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 924 (1982).  Implicit 
in that assumption is the acknowledgement that the state courts 
will be rendering judgments based on a factual record.   
 While some states have certification provisions which 
may permit obtaining a state court's views on state law with only 
a sketchy factual context, see John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, 
Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 Vand. L. 
Rev. 411, 421-22 (1988), New Jersey is not such a state.  In 
fact, New Jersey has expressed a strong policy against issuing 
advisory opinions.  See New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 
Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 445 A.2d 704, 707 (N.J. 
1982) ("We will not render advisory opinions or function in the 
abstract."); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Senate of New Jersey, 397 A.2d 
1098, 1101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 405 A.2d 
811 (N.J. 1979); Biegenwald v. Fauver, 882 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 Thus, the judgment the parties have received from the 
New Jersey courts on the state law claims binds them, absent      
any federal impediment.  This is so even in the rare Pullman 
abstention case such as this, where the state court must resolve 
factual disputes or engage in a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis in reaching its conclusions.  In Ivy Club v. Edwards, 
943 F.2d 270, 283 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 
(1992), this court held that "[u]pon return to federal court 
[after Pullman/England], the federal plaintiff may fully litigate 
  
his federal claims, including the factual issues that may be 
identical to those underlying the state law question."  However, 
in recognition of the nature of the state court proceedings as 
authoritative, we also held that "issue preclusion applies . . .  
to the state law question decided by the state court."  Id. 
 This modified application of the preclusion doctrine to 
the state law claims is consistent with the policies underlying 
not only the full faith and credit statute, but also the Rules of 
Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).  The Rules of Decision 
Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, requires as a 
matter of federalism that a federal court sitting in diversity 
attempt to apply state law as if it were a state court.  In this 
case, for example, the district court needed to determine which 
state's law a New Jersey court would apply to the 1984 Agreement.  
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  A 
New Jersey court, in fact the highest New Jersey court, has 
definitively answered that question.  As long as the parties had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the state 
proceeding, cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 
481-82 (1982), it would offend all notions of comity and common 
sense to permit relitigation of that issue.  Thus we hold that 
the New Jersey courts were entitled to resolve the state law 
issues presented in the context of the declaratory judgment suit 
(whether the parties' agreement was covered by the NJFPA), and we 
are bound to accept their answer (yes), as well as the factual 
and legal findings necessary to that answer. 
  
 B. 
 Commerce Clause 
 We thus turn to the district court's holding that, 
accepting the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision that the 1984 
Agreement was governed by the NJFPA, that statute violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause when applied to activities of a New 
Jersey franchise outside New Jersey.15 
 The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have 
Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States."  
U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Supreme Court "long has 
recognized that this affirmative grant of authority to Congress 
also encompasses an implicit or 'dormant' limitation on the 
authority of the States to enact legislation affecting interstate 
commerce."  Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 
(1989).16  The Commerce Clause reflects "the Constitution's 
                     
15
.  CCC does not claim that New Jersey's choice-of-law holding 
itself violates the Commerce Clause and thus we do not reach that 
distinct question.  See Harold W. Horowitz, Comment, The Commerce 
Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 81 Harv. 
L. Rev. 806, 813-24 (1971). 
16
.  ISI seems to argue that if application of the NJFPA to the 
1984 Agreement meets the requirements of due process, there can 
be no Commerce Clause problem.  It is clear, however, that the 
"[l]ocal regulations which would pass muster under the Due 
Process Clause might nonetheless fail to survive other challenges 
to constitutionality that bring the Supremacy Clause into play.  
Like any local law that conflicts with federal regulatory 
measures, state regulations that run afoul of the policy of free 
trade reflected in the Commerce Clause must also bow."  Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (citations 
omitted); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 
(1992) (distinguishing application of due process and commerce 
clauses). 
  
special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic 
union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate 
commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within 
their respective spheres."  Id. at 335-36. 
 The Supreme Court has articulated two tiers of scrutiny 
in analyzing statutes that regulate interstate commerce: 
 
 When a state statute directly regulates or 
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its 
effect is to favor in-state economic interests over 
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down 
the statute without further inquiry.  When, however, a 
statute only has indirect effects on interstate 
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined 
whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether 
the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the 
local benefits. 
 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 
U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (citations omitted).  In the end, the 
crucial consideration is "the overall effect of the statute on 
both local and interstate commerce."  Healy, 491 U.S. at 337 
n.14. 
 1. 
 Per Se Violations 
 "The principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate 
commerce."  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 
87 (1987).  Such statutes are virtually per se invalid.  See C & 
A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 
(1994); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1978).  
However, both parties agree that as the NJFPA does not 
  
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state franchisors, 
there is no discrimination against interstate commerce.  Instead, 
the district court treated the statute as a "direct" regulation 
of interstate commerce. 
 CCC argues, and the district court agreed, that 
imposing the NJFPA upon a multistate contract is per se invalid 
because it has the practical effect of regulating 
extraterritorially.17  The Supreme Court has noted on more than 
one occasion that "the Commerce Clause precludes the application 
of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of 
the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects 
within the State," and that the "critical inquiry is whether the 
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond 
the boundaries of the State."  Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quotation 
and citations omitted); see also Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582 
("Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State 
before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates 
interstate commerce."); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 
(1982) ("[A]ny attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States 
and exceed the inherent limits of the State's power." (quotation 
                     
17
.  At least one commentator has suggested that 
"extraterritoriality is not a dormant commerce clause problem" 
but acknowledges that the "[Supreme] Court has frequently treated 
extraterritorially, when it has arisen in the context of a 
dormant commerce clause case, as if it were a dormant commerce 
clause problem."  Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. 
v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1865, 1873 (1987). 
  
and citation omitted)); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 
511, 521 (1935) ("New York has no power to project its 
legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in 
that state for milk acquired there."); see also Old Bridge 
Chems., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d 
1287, 1293 (3d Cir.) ("The Supreme Court has invalidated state 
statutes where a state has 'projected' its legislation into other 
states and directly regulated commerce therein, thereby either 
forcing individuals to abandon commerce in other states or 
forcing other states to alter their regulations to conform with 
the conflicting legislation."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 602 
(1992). 
 The fact that application of the NJFPA is triggered by 
in-state activity does not in itself insulate it from scrutiny 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, for not all in-state activity 
is sufficient to justify a law which regulates out-of-state 
transactions of an interstate actor.  Compare Brown-Forman, 476 
U.S. at 580 ("The mere fact that the effects of New York's ABC 
Law are triggered only by sales of liquor within the State of New 
York . . . does not validate the law if it regulates the out-of-
state transactions of distillers who sell in-state.") and MITE, 
457 U.S. at 641-42 (fact that corporation has some contacts with 
Illinois insufficient to permit Illinois to regulate its 
takeovers) with CTS, 481 U.S. at 93 (fact that corporation was 
incorporated in Indiana and has a substantial number of Indiana 
shareholders sufficient to permit Indiana to regulate its 
takeovers). 
  
 On the other hand, it is inevitable that a state's law, 
whether statutory or common law, will have extraterritorial 
effects.  The Supreme Court has never suggested that the dormant 
Commerce Clause requires Balkanization, with each state's law 
stopping at the border.  See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 
Mich. L. Rev. 1865, 1878 (1987) ("prohibition [of all state laws 
that have substantial extraterritorial effects] would invalidate 
much too much legislation.").  In traditional contract 
litigation, courts must apply some state's law to interpret the 
contract.  While a contract which covers multiple states may 
raise a difficult choice-of-law question, once that question is 
resolved there is nothing untoward about applying one state's law 
to the entire contract, even if it requires applying that state's 
law to activities outside the state. 
 CCC does not dispute this, but attempts to distinguish 
the NJFPA, a "state regulation," from an ordinary state contract 
rule.  We see no basis for any such dichotomy.  The construction 
of a contract, including the interpretive policies embodied in 
common law and statutory enactments, is no more or less 
regulatory than the NJFPA, which imposes on franchises governed 
by New Jersey law certain provisions designed to promote fairness 
between the parties. 
 This is not to say that New Jersey would have a right 
to apply the NJFPA to any franchise agreement in the country, as 
long as suit is brought in New Jersey.  But nothing in the text 
  
of the NJFPA reaches that far.  Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court noted that "[b]y definition, the Act, and particularly its 
community-of-interest requirement, is intended to protect 
business parties who made a franchise-specific capital investment 
of either goods or services in New Jersey.  Thus the statute's 
own terms . . . will allow the application of the Act only in 
situations in which there are 'contacts' with the forum [and] 
'interests' arising out of those contacts."  ISI III, 614 A.2d at 
148 (citation omitted); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-4 (West 
1989 & Supp. 1994) (statute limits itself to franchises "the 
performance of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to 
establish or maintain a place of business within the State of New 
Jersey").  Furthermore, under generally accepted choice-of-law 
analysis, the courts measure whether New Jersey has sufficient 
interests with the franchise as to make it appropriate to apply 
the NJFPA.   
 In this case the record is clear that it was the 
parties, not New Jersey, who contemplated that the franchisee 
maintain a place of business in New Jersey.  And it was the 
parties, not New Jersey, who bound themselves to an exclusive 
multistate distribution agreement.  Therefore, it is the parties' 
own agreement which operated to project the New Jersey law 
outside of New Jersey's borders, a result which CCC will find 
ironic but which inevitably follows from the choice-of-law 
analysis. 
 This factor distinguishes this situation from the cases 
relied on by the district court.  In those cases, the state laws  
  
that were held to burden interstate commerce operated independent 
of any party's agreement.  In Healy and Brown-Forman, the states 
enacted price-affirmation statutes for beer and liquor, requiring 
suppliers to affirm that their prices in-state were no higher 
than the lowest price they would charge for their product in 
border states.  These laws were designed in such a way that a 
supplier's price in other states would be dependent on the prices 
it posted in the state enacting the regulation.  However, in 
these cases it was the state, operating independently of any 
parties' contract, which dictated the extraterritorial effect. 
As noted, the situation here is distinguishable.  
 Of course, if the parties were subject to "inconsistent 
legislation" from different states, a law's "practical effect" 
might lead to a Commerce Clause violation.  See, e.g., Healy, 491 
U.S. at 336-37; CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 
582-83; MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43.  On the other hand, state laws 
which merely create additional, but not irreconcilable, 
obligations are not considered to be "inconsistent" for this 
purpose.  See Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, 966 F.2d 777, 784 
n.9 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 In this case, there is no indication that any other 
state will impose demands on ISI or CCC which would require them 
to violate New Jersey law or vice versa.  And while the laws of 
other states might permit CCC to conduct its franchise 
relationship with ISI under a different framework than that 
imposed by the NJFPA, that difference in approach by different 
states is not sufficient to require per se invalidation.  See Old 
  
Bridge Chems., 965 F.2d at 1293 (must show "actual conflict among 
state regulations" in order to demonstrate per se invalidity).   
 Thus the essence of CCC's objection, despite its 
assurance to the contrary, goes to New Jersey's decision on 
choice of law.  Having accepted that decision, as we must, we see 
no facial conflict between the NJFPA and the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
 2. 
 Pike Balancing 
 Because the district court decided the NJFPA was per se 
invalid, it never considered whether the NJFPA passes the 
balancing test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137 (1970).  The Supreme Court has explained that where the 
statute addresses a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."  Id. at 
142.18 
 Inasmuch as the parties argued the Pike balancing test 
in the district court and before us, we will consider whether, 
                     
18
.  The Supreme Court has continued to recite, even if it has 
not applied, the Pike test as late as its last term, see C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 
(1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 
114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994), notwithstanding criticism of the 
Pike balancing by members of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., CTS, 
481 U.S. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) and commentators, see 
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:  
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 
1091, 1106-08 (1986). 
  
again looking at the NJFPA from a facial standpoint only, it 
fails to meet requisite balancing.  In doing so we do not balance 
one state's interests against another, as ISI suggests we should, 
but rather we balance the state's interest against the burden on 
interstate commerce.  See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; Aldens, Inc. v. 
Packel, 524 F.2d 38, 45-50 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
943 (1976). 
 Furthermore, contrary to CCC's argument, we do not look 
at the effect of the state regulation on the commerce of other 
states when we balance.  Instead, "[u]nder this court's 
precedent, the only incidental burdens on interstate commerce 
that implicate the commerce clause . . . are those that 
discriminate against interstate commerce.  We have so held 
because the commerce clause is concerned with protectionism and 
the need for uniformity, and case law demonstrates that 
legislation will not be invalidated under the Pike test unless it 
imposes discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce. . . .  
Thus, where the burden on out-of-state interests rises no higher 
than that placed on competing in-state interests, it is a burden 
on commerce rather than a burden on interstate commerce."  Old 
Bridge Chems., 965 F.2d at 1295 (citations omitted, first 
emphasis added); see also J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New 
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 922 (3d Cir. 
1988); Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 406 (3d 
Cir. 1987).   
 As we explained in Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 
874 F.2d 926, 942-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 
  
(1989), where we upheld a law prohibiting companies that were 
affiliated with savings and loan institutions anywhere in the 
country from selling insurance in Pennsylvania, the fact that a 
law may have "devastating economic consequences" on a particular 
interstate firm is not sufficient to rise to a Commerce Clause 
burden.  Id. at 943.  Instead, the inquiry requires that we 
examine whether the state law adversely affects interstate 
commerce.  "[T]he focus [of the Supreme Court is on] . . . the 
manner by which the statute regulated [and] . . . the fact that 
the statute regulated indiscriminately compel[s] the conclusion 
that the Commerce Clause [has] not been violated."  Id. at 944. 
 Applying this settled law, it is clear that there is no 
burden on interstate commerce inasmuch as the NJFPA is facially 
neutral as to the interstate nature of the parties' agreement.  
CCC claims the NJFPA imposes a straitjacket on its operations and 
ultimately harms consumers by prohibiting the creation of an 
efficient distribution system.  But even assuming this to be 
true, it is indisputable that the statute simply does not 
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state franchisors.  The 
limitation on termination of franchises to reasons of good cause 
is equally applicable to New Jersey-based franchisors as to those 
headquartered elsewhere.  Thus, although the NJFPA may burden 
commerce, it creates no incidental burdens on interstate commerce 
for purposes of Pike balancing.  "Once it is clear no such 
discrimination has been alleged, the inquiry as to the burden on 
interstate commerce should end."  J. Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 922 
(quotations and citations omitted).  In the absence of such a 
  
burden, an analysis of the "putative local benefits" of the NJFPA 
is unnecessary.19   
 In ISI's argument before this court, it expressly 
limited itself to the district court's facial analysis.  It thus  
recognized that the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding did not 
purport to consider whether the NJFPA might, when applied, have a 
burdensome effect on interstate commerce.  That issue, of course, 
could not be resolved as a matter of law, and indeed might have 
to await the interpretation given to the "good cause" provisions 
of the NJFPA.  Although the Commerce Clause analysis and the Due 
Process analysis are distinct, see supra note 17, ISI's counsel 
recognized that there might be due process implications to 
certain interpretations of the NJFPA in the context of existing 
contracts.  That issue was not raised by CCC in its pleadings in 
                     
19
.  Despite the district court's uncertainty about whether the 
New Jersey court's choice-of-law analysis was binding, the court 
applied New Jersey law when entering summary judgment for CCC on 
Counts Two through Seven.  We have reviewed ISI's objections to 
the district court's reasoning and agree with the independent 
state law grounds articulated by the court. 
 
 The district court also entered summary judgment for 
CCC on the part of Count One which alleged that CCC "fail[ed] to 
renew a franchise without good cause" under § 10-5 of the NJFPA.  
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-5 (West 1989).  Both parties agree 
that there may be changes in a franchise agreement that are so 
significant that they amount to a constructive nonrenewal of the 
franchise.  In this case, however, the district court based its 
holding that the 1989 Agreement was a "renewal" of the 1984 
Agreement on its decision that the elimination of the territory 
of eight states followed from the Commerce Clause.  See ISI V, 
supra, at 80 n.47.  In light of our decision, we will reverse the 
entry of summary judgment on this ground as well to allow the 
district court to evaluate the nonrenewal claim anew. 
  
this case,20 and we consider it as beyond the scope of this 
appeal. 
 III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petitions 
for writs of mandamus docketed at Nos. 93-5490 and 93-5635; in 
the appeals docketed at Nos. 93-5414 and 94-5048, we will reverse 
the district court's judgment declaring the NJFPA 
unconstitutional as applied to activities of New Jersey 
franchisees outside of New Jersey and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion; and in the appeal 
docketed at No. 93-5722, we will affirm the district court's 
judgment for CCC on Counts Two through Seven, and reverse its 
judgment for CCC on the nonrenewal portion of Count One and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Costs in Nos. 93-5490, 93-5635, 93-5414 and 94-5048 to be 
assessed against CCC; costs in No. 93-5722 to be assessed against 
ISI. 
                     
20
.  The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision mentioned the due 
process clause, but we did not understand it to make a definitive 
ruling in that connection, and view that reference as part of its 
general discussion on the interpretation of the NJFPA. 
